diff --git a/draft/index.html b/draft/index.html index 859484c..4925f46 100644 --- a/draft/index.html +++ b/draft/index.html @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ FEP-8b32: Object Integrity Proofs codeberg Implementation -9 +10 #29 Discussions 2022-11-12 diff --git a/fep/8b32/index.html b/fep/8b32/index.html index 37de842..ff5fb57 100644 --- a/fep/8b32/index.html +++ b/fep/8b32/index.html @@ -655,6 +655,18 @@
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    Recipients of an object SHOULD perform proof verification if it contains integrity proofs.

    Verification process MUST follow the Data Integrity specification, section 4.4 Verify Proof. It starts with the removal of the proof value from the JSON object. Then verification method is retrieved from the controlled identifier document as described in Controlled Identifiers specification, section 3.3 Retrieve Verification Method. Then the object is canonicalized, hashed and signature verification is performed according to the parameters specified in the proof.

    The subject of the controlled identifier document where the verification method is expressed MUST be the owner of the signed object, or a DID that is provably associated with that actor (e.g. using a mechanism described in FEP-c390 or FEP-ef61).

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    If a verifier encounters an integrity proof that uses a verification method or cryptosuite that it doesn't support, it SHOULD ignore the proof and try other authentication methods.

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    If a verifier encounters an integrity proof that uses a verification method that it can't resolve, or uses a cryptosuite that is not supported, or the proof has expired (as indicated by the expires property), the verifier SHOULD ignore the proof and try other authentication methods.

    If both HTTP signature and integrity proof are used, the integrity proof MUST be given precedence over HTTP signature. The HTTP signature MAY be dismissed.

    Algorithms

    Implementers are expected to pursue broad interoperability when choosing algorithms for integrity proofs.

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  • tootik
  • Gush! (commit)
  • squidcity
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  • Mastodon (verification)
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    Use cases

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    Future work

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    Use cases

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    Quantum-resistant cryptosuites

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    This document recommends the eddsa-jcs-2022 cryptosuite, which is not secure against attacks by quantum computers. At the time of writing, the cryptosuites for quantum-resistant integrity proofs are being standardized in Quantum-Resistant Cryptosuites v1.0 specification.

    References